Zero-Trust enforcement for enterprise AI.
DeepInspect authorizes, redacts, or blocks every AI request inline, then writes a cryptographically signed forensic record for regulatory defense.
Four surfaces of the AI governance problem, one control plane.
The gateway sits in the request path with sub-50ms overhead, evaluates policy, and writes an evidence-grade record before the response is released.
Intelligent Security
Identity- and data-aware enforcement. Inline. Fail-closed.
Verifiable Governance
HMAC-signed forensic record for every decision.
Cost & Routing
Tier-based model routing, failover, per-token attribution.
Agent & MCP Governance
Per-tool policy and signed agent traces across every hop.
Who Owns AI Governance Liability in an Enterprise?
AI governance is a responsibility boundary. Regulators and boards want enforcement records, not dashboards.
The boundary falls on the enterprise rather than the model provider. Provider terms of service place contractual responsibility for how a model is used inside a customer environment on the customer. A regulatory inquiry about a specific AI decision reaches the CISO and the compliance officer, and the durable answer is a runtime record of how each AI request was handled together with the policy version in effect at the time.
Enterprises own:
Each obligation maps to an operational record only the enterprise can produce. Regulatory exposure resolves when the enterprise shows the specific decisions the system made and the policy versions in effect. Audit outcomes improve when the auditor reads records that each carry a per-record cryptographic signature verifiable on its own. Breach narratives hold together when every AI interaction in the sequence carries its own integrity proof. Board accountability follows the pattern of financial controls, signed attestations rather than best-effort summaries.
Governance requires reconstruction of who accessed what data and why a decision was allowed.
The risk lives in ungoverned AI usage inside your enterprise.
Point your AI client at the gateway. Nothing else changes.
Enforcement activates gradually from observe mode to enforce mode, per application and per data class. Application code stays intact.
Product
Inline enforcement between callers and models.
Identity-aware policy, deterministic evaluation, fail-closed by default. Sub-50ms overhead in the request path.
Forensics
Signed record for every AI decision.
Reconstruct any interaction. Verify integrity per record.
Architecture
Deterministic policy engine, default-deny posture.
Deploys inline. Payload-agnostic. Provider-neutral.
< 50ms
Gateway overhead
100%
Decisions signed
6+
Providers supported
HMAC
Per-record integrity
Recent thinking.
All posts →November 20, 2026
Active Token Introspection for Authenticated LLM Requests
Active token introspection for LLM requests gives a resource server a current authorization-server decision before it routes an authenticated user or agent to a model. This guide defines the RFC 7662 request and response boundary, endpoint authentication, claim checks, caching trade-offs, fail-closed behavior, privacy controls, negative tests, and the audit evidence needed to prove that inactive tokens never reach an LLM provider.
November 20, 2026
Reject Query-String Access Tokens on Authenticated LLM Routes
Authenticated LLM routes should reject access tokens carried in URI query parameters before normal routing, prompt parsing, or model forwarding. RFC 9700 prohibits clients from passing access tokens this way, while RFC 6750 documents the logging risk and makes the Authorization header the supported default. This guide defines ingress behavior, safe errors, logging controls, migration, and production tests.
November 20, 2026
Prevent Cross-JWT Confusion in LLM APIs with Exclusive Token Profiles
Cross-JWT confusion lets a JWT issued for one purpose enter an LLM API as a different token class. Prevention requires an exclusive acceptance profile that checks explicit type and issuer-bound signing material, then verifies audience, required claims, algorithm, and time constraints before any principal reaches model authorization. This guide turns RFC 8725 and RFC 9068 into a negative-testable release control.